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Abstract This fMRI study investigates the neural
mechanisms supporting the retrieval of action semantics. A
novel motor imagery task was used in which participants
were required to imagine planning actions with a familiar
object (e.g. a toothbrush) or with an unfamiliar object (e.g.
a pair of pliers) based on either goal-related information
(i.e. where to move the object) or grip-related information
(i.e. how to grasp the object). Planning actions with unfa-
miliar compared to familiar objects was slower and was
associated with increased activation in the bilateral supe-
rior parietal lobe, the right inferior parietal lobe and the
right insula. The stronger activation in parietal areas for
unfamiliar objects fits well with the idea that parietal areas
are involved in motor imagery and suggests that this pro-
cess takes more effort in the case of novel or unfamiliar
actions. In contrast, the planning of familiar actions
resulted in increased activation in the anterior prefrontal
cortex, suggesting that subjects maintained a stronger goal-
representation when planning actions with familiar
compared to unfamiliar objects. These findings provide
further insight into the neural structures that support action
semantic knowledge for the functional use of real-world
objects and suggest that action semantic knowledge is
activated most readily when actions are planned in a goal-
directed manner.
Keywords Action planning  Action semantics  Objects 
Goals  Grips  Superior parietal cortex
Introduction
Our capacity to use tools and objects is often considered
one of the hallmarks of the human species (Johnson-Frey
2003; Lewis 2006). Although chimpanzees may occasion-
ally use tools, this ability turns out to be very limited and
rigid (e.g. using stones to open nuts; Biro et al. 2003;
Hayashi et al. 2005). In contrast, humans have the
remarkable capability to use objects in a flexible fashion
(cf. van Elk et al. 2009) and to combine multiple objects in
complex actions. For instance, while in a restaurant you
might want to pour your partner a glass of wine in which
case you would probably grasp the wine bottle closer to the
bottom in order to facilitate a pouring action. On the other
hand, if the goal were to chill the wine, you would need to
hold the bottle close to the top to facilitate the insertion of
the bottle into an ice bucket. In either case, a particular goal
leads to the selection of an appropriate way of grasping the
object that is critically dependent on action semantic
knowledge about an object’s functional properties.
As the example illustrates, many of our actions are
guided by action semantic knowledge whereby higher-
level action goals (e.g. pouring a glass of wine) determine
the selection of lower-level action features (e.g. grasping
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the wine bottle at the lower side). Several recent theoretical
views have proposed that our ability to perform complex
actions relies on the hierarchical organization of the motor
system and that action goals are an organizing feature of
action planning (Cooper 2002; Grafton and Hamilton 2007;
Rosenbaum et al. 2007). According to this view, actions
consist of sequences of motor primitives brought together
to achieve a desired goal (e.g. making coffee; Grafton and
Hamilton 2007). In support of this view, behavioral studies
have shown that both humans and monkeys plan their
actions in a way that allows them to end the action in a
comfortable end-posture, which is known as the end-state
comfort effect (Cohen and Rosenbaum 2004, 2011; Weiss
et al. 2007; Chapman et al. 2010). For instance, subjects
tend to grasp objects in a different way when they are
required to rotate the object upside down compared to
when they are required to put the object away (Herbort and
Butz 2011).
Anticipatory action planning relies on the use of a pre-
dictive model that takes into account the final goal of the
action and the movement constraints of the body (Wolpert
et al. 1998; Wolpert and Ghahramani 2000). Several
studies have shown that the parietal and prefrontal cortex
play an important role in instantiating the predictive model
and in representing the final goal of an action. For instance,
apraxic patients with parietal lesions showed an impair-
ment in selecting the appropriate handgrip for grasping
inverted tools (Sunderland et al. 2011). In addition, these
patients had difficulties with recognizing object-related
gestures (Buxbaum et al. 2007; Kalenine et al. 2010) and
did not show the same anticipatory motor-response during
the observation of object-directed actions as healthy sub-
jects (Fontana et al. 2011). Furthermore, recent neuroim-
aging studies have shown that planning a sequence of
movements to achieve a desired end-state relies on acti-
vation in prefrontal brain areas, whereas selecting move-
ments based on a specific grip type enhanced activation in
the parieto-occipito sulcus (Majdandzic et al. 2007; van
Schie and Bekkering 2007).
Although these studies provide insight into the neural
mechanisms underlying anticipatory action planning, an
often overlooked aspect in the domain of motor control is
that many actions require the use of semantic knowledge.
Knowing what to do with a wine bottle is something that
cannot be inferred solely on the basis of an object’s spatial
features (Gibson 1979). It involves associating an intended
goal (e.g. pouring wine into a glass) with a specific way of
grasping the object (i.e. grasping the bottle at the lower
side)—a process that requires semantic knowledge. Your
partner would be quite surprised if you grasped the wine
bottle near the base and then moved it toward the bucket,
and even more surprised if wine was poured into it. The
importance of semantic knowledge for planning actions
with multiple objects becomes unmistakably clear in
patients with the action disorganization syndrome (ADS) or
apraxia, who often fail to combine objects in a meaningful
fashion, thereby resulting in incorrect action sequences
(e.g. spooning butter in one’s coffee instead of on one’s
bread; Rumiati et al. 2001; Schwartz 2006). Behavioral
studies underline the importance of semantics for action
planning. For instance, it was found that a concurrent
semantic task interfered more strongly with grasping
objects than a concurrent visuospatial task (Creem and
Proffitt 2001). Furthermore, it has been shown that plan-
ning meaningful actions with objects results in a priming
effect for words that were congruent with the intended end
location of the action (Lindemann et al. 2006; van Elk et al.
2009). Together these studies provide behavioral support
for the importance of semantic knowledge for successful
action planning.
Still, the neural mechanisms supporting the retrieval of
action semantics and the process whereby action semantics
guides the selection of goals and grips are not well
understood. In the present study, we used a novel motor
imagery paradigm whereby goals and grips for planning an
object-directed action were selected based on action
semantic knowledge. Participants were required to imagine
planning an action in which a central object (e.g. a wine
bottle) had to be moved toward a target object (e.g. a wine
glass). The effect of action semantics on the selection of
goals and grips was investigated by manipulating the
familiarity of the objects involved (i.e. subjects’ experience
with using these objects). Familiarity has a strong influence
on how effectively semantic knowledge is used in language
and other cognitive processes (Connine et al. 1990;
Montaldi et al. 2006). Similarly, semantic knowledge of an
object’s functional properties is highly dependent on prior
physical experience, and object familiarity may influence
the ease whereby inferences are made about the goal or the
grip for using the object (Tessari and Rumiati 2004; van
Elk et al. 2009; van Elk et al. 2010b). Thus, in the present
study, we manipulated the familiarity of the objects
involved, by including both familiar and unfamiliar
objects. Familiar objects are typically used in a daily
fashion (e.g. a knife or a toothbrush), whereas unfamiliar
objects are only used occasionally (e.g. a pair of pliers, a
soup ladle). As a consequence, semantic knowledge about
the use of objects is probably more easily activated when
planning actions with familiar compared to unfamiliar
objects.
To assess the importance of action semantics for
selecting both action goals and action grips, we manipu-
lated the mode of action planning, by instructing subjects
to plan an action based on goal- or grip-related information
(for a similar manipulation, see: Majdandzic et al. 2007;
van Schie and Bekkering 2007). In case of a ‘goal cue’,
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subjects were required to indicate how they should grasp a
specific object in order to move it to a pre-specified goal. In
the case of a ‘grip cue’, subjects were instructed to indicate
whether they would move the central object to the left or
the right target object, given a pre-specified way of
grasping the central object. As previous studies have shown
a distinction between brain areas supporting action plan-
ning based on goal- or grip-related information (Maj-
dandzic et al. 2007; van Schie and Bekkering 2007) in the
present study, we expected a similar differentiation
between brain areas involved in representing the goal or the
grip of an action. More importantly, given the notion that
action semantics entails both grip- and goal-related
knowledge (van Elk et al. 2008), it was expected that object
familiarity modulates the strength of activation in brain
areas representing action goals (such as the anterior pre-
frontal cortex) and action grips (such as the inferior parietal
lobe and the parieto-occipital sulcus).
Materials and methods
Subjects
In total, 18 subjects participated in the experiment (7
women, mean age = 19.8 years) who received 60 USD for
participation. Data from 2 subjects were excluded from the
analysis because of performance at chance level. Subjects
declared themselves through informal verbal inquiry to be
right-handed. All subjects gave informed written consent in
accordance with the guidelines from the Human Subjects
Committee, Office of Research, University of California,
Santa Barbara. The study was conducted in accordance
with the declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli
Stimuli consisted of pictures representing a central object
(e.g. a wine bottle) placed between two target objects (e.g.
a wine glass and a wine bucket; see Fig. 1). As stimuli, 14
different object pairs were selected. Each object could be
grasped in two separate ways (e.g. a wine bottle can be
grasped at the upper or lower side), and each grasp type
was associated with a different target object (e.g. moving
the bottle to the wine glass or to the wine bucket; see
Table 1).
Half of all central objects were relatively familiar,
whereas the other half of all objects was relatively unfa-
miliar (see Table 1). The classification of objects was
based on a test in which a group of subjects who did not
participate in the fMRI study were asked to rate the cen-
trally presented objects on a 5-point scale according to their
familiarity (‘How familiar is the object represented in the
picture? In other words: how often do you use an object
like this?’). Based on the familiarity ratings, half of all
objects were classified as relatively familiar (mean famil-
iarity rating = 4.8), whereas the other half of all objects
was classified as unfamiliar (mean familiarity rating =
2.1).
A cue was superimposed on the central object, consist-
ing of a black arrow. In the case of a goal cue, the arrow
was pointing to the left or the right object, and in the case
of a grip cue, the arrow was pointing to the upper or lower
side of the central object (see Fig. 1). Goal cues indicated
to which target object the central object should be moved
and thereby implied a specific way of grasping the central
object (i.e. at the upper or lower side). Grip cues indicated
at which part the central object should be grasped and
thereby implied that the central object should be moved to
one of the target objects.
Fig. 1 Example stimuli used in the experiment. Target stimuli
consisted of pictures representing an arrow superimposed on a central
object and two target objects. In the case of a Goal Cue (upper panel),
the arrow was pointing to the left or the right target object, thereby
specifying to which object the central object should be moved. In the
case of a Grip Cue (lower panel), the arrow was pointing to the upper
or lower side of the central object, thereby specifying at which side
the central object should be grasped. The implied goal of the action
could be the left or the right target object (i.e. left and right side of
each panel) and the implied grip of the action could be a grip at the
upper part or lower part of the central object (i.e. upper and lower side
of each panel)
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The location of the target objects was counterbalanced,
such that in half of all pictures, each grasp type was
associated with a movement toward the left target object,
and in the other half of all pictures, the grasp type was
associated with a movement toward the right target object
(see Fig. 1). Thus, for each object pair, 8 different pictures
were created according to the following design: Action Cue
(goal vs. grip), Implied Goal (left vs. right) and Implied
Grip (up vs. down).
Experimental design and procedure
Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross
after which a picture appeared on the screen (see Fig. 2).
During grip blocks, subjects observed a ‘grip cue’ (i.e.
arrow pointing to the upper or lower part of the central
object) and made an inference about the goal of the action
(i.e. deciding whether they would move the central object
to the left or right target object). In contrast, during goal
blocks, subjects observed a ‘goal cue’ (i.e. an arrow
pointing to the left or the right target object) and made an
inference about the grip of the action (i.e. deciding whether
they would grasp the central object at the upper or lower
side). Thus, during grip blocks, subjects responded by
making a left or a right button press, and during goal
blocks, the response box was rotated 90 to allow subjects
to respond with an up or down button press (see Fig. 2).
Subjects always responded with the index and middle fin-
ger of their right hand. If subjects did not respond within
3,000 ms after picture onset, the next trial was initiated.
In total subjects performed one grip block and one goal
block, each consisting of 200 trials. Block order was
counterbalanced between participants. A pseudorandom
trial ordering specified by an m-sequence (Buracas and
Boynton 2002) ensured a counterbalanced stimulus pre-
sentation over the experiment. Trials were separated by a
variable interval of 4 or 6 s (2–3 TRs), and the onset of
the picture was pseudorandomly jittered in steps varying
between 0 and 1,000 ms in 100 ms steps. Every 50 trials
visual feedback was given about the subject’s perfor-
mance for 10 s. At the beginning of the experiment out-
side the scanner, the task was carefully explained and the
different object pairs were visually presented to ensure
that the participant would recognize each of the objects
used.
During the experiment, we recorded subjects’ EEG as
well by means of an MRI compatible EEG system (Brain-
Amp MR, Brain Products). Unfortunately, the EEG signal
was too distorted by gradient, pulse, ECG and ocular
artifacts to be used for subsequent analysis. Therefore, we
only report the fMRI data here.
Table 1 Central objects and target objects used in the experiment
Objects Target object 1 Target object 2
Familiar
Wine bottle Wine glass Wine bucket
Cola can Glass Car
Spoon Cornflakes Kitchen utensil rack
Corkscrew Wine bottle Beer bottle
Knife Butter Knife tray
Toothbrush Toothpaste Toothbrush holder
Spatula Pan Cutlery stand
Unfamiliar
Soup ladle Pan Suspension rail
Sports bottle Cup Bicycle holder
Vinegar bottle Salad Oil/vinegar set
Pliers Open end plier holder Wood plier block
Hammer Nail Tool utensil rack
Ancient key Antique lock Key holder
Charcoal Blackboard Box of charcoal
The upper panel represents familiar objects and the lower panel
represents unfamiliar objects. The middle column and right column
represent the associated target objects for each central object
Fig. 2 Overview of the experimental setup and procedure. In goal
blocks subjects were presented with a picture representing a goal cue
(i.e. arrow pointing to the left or right target object). Based on the
goal cue subjects were required to indicate at which part they would
grasp the central object (i.e. at the upper or lower side), in case they
should move it towards the specified target object. For instance, in
case of the arrow pointing to the wine glass, the correct response
would be to press the down button, as the wine bottle needs to be
grasped at the lower side in order to pour wine in the glass. In grip
blocks subjects were presented with a picture representing a grip cue
(i.e. arrow pointing to the upper or lower part of the central object).
Based on the grip cue subjects were required to indicate to which
target object they would move the central object (i.e. left or right
target object), in case they grasped it at the indicated side. For
instance, in case of the arrow pointing towards the lower side of the
wine bottle, the correct response would be to press the left button, as
grasping the bottle at the lower side allows pouring wine in the glass
192 Exp Brain Res (2012) 218:189–200
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Behavioral data and analysis
Behavioral analysis focused on reaction times and error
rates. Trials in which the subject made an incorrect
response or missed trials were discarded from reaction time
analysis. Reaction times and error rates were averaged per
condition and subject and were analyzed using a repeated
measures ANOVA with the factors Action cue (Goal cue
vs. Grip cue) and Familiarity (Familiar vs. Unfamiliar
objects).
MRI recording and analysis
Images were acquired on a Siemens 3T Magnetom Trio
system with a 12-channel phased-array head coil. Func-
tional images were acquired using a T2-weighted echo-
planar gradient-echo imaging sequence (repetition time
[TR] = 2,000 ms; echo time [TE] = 30 ms). Each vol-
ume consisted of 37 slices acquired parallel to the
anterior-posterior commissure plane (interleaved acquisi-
tion; 3 mm with 0.5 mm gap; 3 9 3 9 3 mm in-plane
resolution). After the functional runs, a high-resolution T1-
weighted sagittal sequence image of the whole brain was
acquired (TR = 15 ms; TE = 4.2 ms; FA = 9; FOV =
256 mm).
Statistical analyses were conducted using SPM8 soft-
ware (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology,
London, UK). Preprocessing steps involved realignment,
correction for motion and differences in slice acquisition
time, spatial normalization and smoothing with an iso-
tropic Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full-width at half-maxi-
mum. Anatomical normalization to MNI space was
performed by coregistration of the functional images with
the anatomical T1 scan. To minimize the effect of signal
changes due to movements, we used the robust weighted
least-squares algorithm (rWLS) that inversely weights
each image by the inverse of its variance (Diedrichsen and
Shadmehr 2005).
First-level fMRI analyses were performed for each
individual subject according to the GLM. The fMRI time
series for both blocks was fitted in one statistical model,
with four regressors (and their temporal derivatives)
according to the four possible combinations of action cues
(goal cue vs grip cue) and object familiarity (familiar vs.
unfamiliar). Regressors of no interest included: incorrect
and missed responses, button press responses and perfor-
mance feedback. After estimation, beta values were taken
to the second level for random effects analysis to obtain a
population estimate for the effects of action cues and
object familiarity. Reported activations are at p \ .05
corrected at the cluster level for multiple comparisons
using an auxiliary (uncorrected) voxel threshold of
p \ .001.
Results
Behavioral results
Behavioral data are represented in Fig. 3. Overall, subjects
made errors in 9.3% of all trials and subjects missed
responses in 1.4% of all trials. The analysis of error rates
revealed a main effect of Object, F(1, 15) = 20.6,
p \ .001, gp
2 = 0.58, reflecting more errors for unfamiliar
(6.2%) compared to familiar objects (3.1%). In addition, a
marginally significant interaction was observed between
Action cue and Object, F(1, 15) = 4.4, p = .055,
gp
2 = 0.23, reflecting relatively more errors for unfamiliar
objects in response to goal cues.
For the analysis of reaction times, a main effect of
Familiarity, F(1, 15) = 26.7, p \ .001, gp
2 = 0.64, reflec-
ted faster responses to familiar (1,280 ms) compared to
unfamiliar objects (1,352 ms). Although a tendency was
observed for faster responses to goal cues (1,278 ms)
compared to grip cues (1,353 ms), the effect of Action cue
did not reach statistical significance, F(1, 15) = 3.4,
p = .09, gp
2 = 0.18.
fMRI results
First to identify task-related brain activation, all conditions
were compared relative to baseline. It was found that
performing the experimental task resulted in increased
activation in bilateral occipital, parietal, premotor areas,
the insula and anterior prefrontal areas (see Fig. 4).
Comparing trials in which subjects made an inference
about the goal compared to the grip of the action did not
yield any significant difference, when corrected for multi-
ple comparisons.
When comparing trials in which familiar objects com-
pared to unfamiliar objects were presented, we observed
increased activation in the anterior prefrontal cortex (MPF)
extending to the anterior cingulate cortex, the right sup-
plementary motor area (SMA) and the posterior cingulate
(see Fig. 5a). Comparing trials in which unfamiliar objects
were presented compared to familiar objects revealed
increased activation in the bilateral superior parietal lobe
(SPL), the right inferior parietal lobe (IPL) and the right
insula (see Fig. 5b). The left and right SPL fall within the
probability range (40–70%) of Brodmann Area (BA) 7a
(Eickhoff et al. 2005). The right IPL falls within the
probability range (30–60%) of human intraparietal area 3
(hIP3). A complete list of activated brain regions is rep-
resented in Table 2.
Finally, we were interested in the question whether the
effects of Object familiarity were modulated by the type of
action inference that was made (i.e. making an inference
about the goal or the grip). When corrected for multiple
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comparisons, the interaction between Action cue and
Object did not reach statistical significance.
Using a region of interest (ROI) analysis based on the
averaged activation estimates for each of the areas that
were found significant for the main effect of Object
familiarity, an interaction was observed between Object
familiarity and Action Cue in the right IPL, F(1, 15) = 4.8,
p \ .05. This interaction reflected that the effect of Object
Familiarity in this area was stronger for goal cues com-
pared to grip cues (see Fig. 5). No interaction effects were
observed in the other ROIs. Please note that this ROI
analysis was conducted for explorative purposes only and
to determine whether the strength of activation in areas
responsive to Object Familiarity, was modulated by the
orthogonal factor of Action Cue.
Discussion
We used a motor imagery paradigm in which participants
were required to imagine planning object-directed actions.
We manipulated the familiarity of the objects involved by
including both familiar (e.g. a toothbrush) and unfamiliar
objects (e.g. a pair of pliers). In addition, we manipulated
the type of action inference that was made: subjects were
required either to select the appropriate grip type given a
pre-specified goal (Goal cue) or to select the goal of an
action given a specific grip type (Grip cue).
We found that planning actions with unfamiliar com-
pared to familiar objects was slower and was associated
with increased activation in parietal brain areas. The faster
responses to familiar compared to unfamiliar objects are in
line with studies on action planning, showing a comparable
advantage for planning familiar compared to unfamiliar
actions (Tessari and Rumiati 2004; van Elk et al. 2009; van
Elk et al. 2010b), and with studies on semantic dementia,
showing an advantage for familiar objects in the retrieval
of action semantics (Lambon Ralph et al. 1998). The
reaction time advantage reflects that action planning was
easier in the case of familiar objects, likely because action
semantics could be more easily activated. In contrast, for
unfamiliar objects, the activation of action semantics took
more effort, as reflected in slower reaction times.
The planning of actions with unfamiliar objects was
associated with increased activation in the bilateral supe-
rior parietal lobes (SPL) and the right inferior parietal lobe
(IPL). Several studies have shown that the parietal lobe
plays an important role in instantiating a predictive model
of an upcoming action and in representing the grip of an
action in relation to its end location (Wolpert et al. 1998;
Wolpert and Ghahramani 2000). For instance, whereas
healthy participants typically adjust their handgrip
according to the consecutive use of an object (Cohen and
Rosenbaum 2004; Weiss et al. 2007; Chapman et al. 2010;
Cohen and Rosenbaum 2011), apraxic patients with pari-
etal lesions showed an impairment in selecting the appro-
priate handgrip for grasping inverted tools (Sunderland
et al. 2011). In line with these findings, in a recent study, it
was found that activation in the right IPL and superior
parietal cortex selectively increased with greater demands
on prospective grasp planning (e.g. simple grasping vs.
grasping to rotate; Marangon et al. 2011). Finally, studies
in monkeys have shown that grasping neurons in the IPL
fire selectively depending on the final goal of the action
(e.g. grasping to eat or place; Fogassi et al. 2005; Bonini
et al. 2010). Thus, the stronger activation in IPL and SPL
Fig. 3 Behavioral results. The
left graph represents error rates
and the right graph represents
reaction times for goal cues (left
side of graph) and grip cues
(right side of graph) in response
to pictures representing familiar
objects (white bars) or
unfamiliar objects (gray bars).
Error bars represent standard
errors
Fig. 4 Task-related brain activation. Brain rendering showing areas
commonly activated during the experimental task compared to
baseline. All clusters are significant at p \ .05, FWE-corrected for
multiple comparisons
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found in the present study suggests that determining the
grip in relation to its end location took more effort when
planning actions with unfamiliar compared to familiar
objects.
The finding that motor-related brain areas are differen-
tially involved in imagining familiar compared to unfa-
miliar actions is in line with previous studies. For instance,
two recent EEG studies showed that the planning and
execution of unfamiliar compared to familiar actions was
associated with a stronger desynchronization and a sub-
sequent rebound in the beta-frequency band that was
localized to parietal areas (van Elk et al. 2010b; Mizelle
et al. 2011). In addition, other studies have shown that the
observation of unfamiliar tools or the processing of
Fig. 5 Brain activation
modulated by Object
Familiarity. a Brain areas that
were significantly more
activated for familiar compared
to unfamiliar objects overlaid on
the standard MNI brain. The left
picture represents a sagittal
view of activation in medial
brain areas, encompassing the
medial prefrontal cortex (MPF)
extending to the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC), the
right supplementary motor area
(SMA) and the posterior
cingulate cortex (PCC). The
right pictures represent an axial
view of SMA (upper picture)
and MPF and PCC activation
(lower picture). b Brain areas
that were more strongly
activated for unfamiliar
compared to familiar objects
overlaid on the standard MNI
brain. The left picture represents
a sagittal view of the right
hemisphere representing
activation in the right insula
(rIns) and the right superior
parietal lobe (SPL). The right
pictures represent an axial view
of bilateral IPL/SPL activation
(upper picture) and rIns
activation. All clusters are
significant at p \ .05, FWE-
corrected for multiple
comparisons. Bar graphs on the
right represent the BOLD
response averaged for each
activated region for the different
experimental conditions
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unfamiliar actions resulted in increased activation in
motor-related areas as well (Handy et al. 2006; Beilock
et al. 2008; Stapel et al. 2010). Together these studies fit
well with the notion that parietal areas are involved in
mental imagery of actions and that this process takes more
effort in case of difficult actions (for similar findings with
the classical hand rotation paradigm, see: de Lange et al.
2005, 2006). Importantly, the effects in parietal areas
cannot be attributed to the affordances triggered by simply
viewing the objects. Based on the object’s affordances, we
should expect a stronger activation for familiar compared
to unfamiliar objects in parietal areas instead, because the
affordances of familiar objects can be more easily per-
ceived than of unfamiliar objects.
In addition to the activation in parietal areas, a stronger
activation for unfamiliar compared to familiar objects was
observed in the right insular cortex. More specifically, the
activation was centered in the anterior part of the insula, a
brain region that has strong connections with motor-related
areas (Mufson and Mesulam 1982), that is consistently
found activated in motor tasks involving the upper and
lower limbs (Fink et al. 1997) and that has been associated
with a feeling of agency as well (Farrer and Frith 2002;
Karnath and Baier 2010). Accordingly, it has been sug-
gested that the insula is involved in generating intentions,
based on interoceptive signals regarding the subject’s body
(Brass and Haggard 2010) and with the subjective feeling
of moving (Mutschler et al. 2009). The stronger insular
activation for unfamiliar objects could reflect that imag-
ining actions with unfamiliar objects results in a stronger
motor imagery process—as reflected in increased parietal
activation—accompanied by a stronger feeling of moving.
The planning of actions with familiar objects was
associated with increased activation in medial frontal brain
areas, such as the superior medial frontal gyrus (sMFG)
extending to the anterior prefrontal cortex and the anterior
cingulate. These frontal regions have been associated with
the planning of movement sequences (Rowe et al. 2000;
Shima and Tanji 2000; Rushworth et al. 2004) and the
planning of actions with respect to the intended end loca-
tion (Majdandzic et al. 2007). In addition, this area sup-
ports maintaining a final task goal while processing several
subgoals, as for instance in the Tower of London task
(Koechlin et al. 1999; Burgess et al. 2000; Sakai et al.
2002). The stronger activation in these regions could reflect
that subjects maintained a stronger goal-representation
when planning actions with familiar compared to unfa-
miliar objects.
In the present study, subjects tended to respond faster
when imagining an action based on goal-related informa-
tion compared to grip-related information. This finding
reflects that the natural and most efficient way of planning
our actions is the case in which we select a grip based on
goal-related information (Cohen and Rosenbaum 2004;
Rosenbaum et al. 2007). The advantage for goal compared
to grip cues is in line with previous studies that have
reported a similar advantage for planning actions in terms
of the intended end location compared to the grip required
for object grasping (Majdandzic et al. 2007; van Schie and
Bekkering 2007). However, in contrast to these previous
studies in the present study, no general difference in brain
activation was found between imaginary actions that were
planned based on goal-related information compared to
grip-related information. This apparent discrepancy may be
related to the specific experimental paradigm and design.
In previous studies, participants were required to actually
plan and execute real-world actions (Majdandzic et al.
2007; van Schie and Bekkering 2007). In contrast, the
present study used a motor imagery paradigm, thereby
making it more difficult to control for individual differ-
ences in timing and the strategy used for solving the task.
In addition, previous studies used novel objects and goal-
Table 2 Overview of regions more strongly activated for familiar compared to unfamiliar objects (upper panel) and for unfamiliar compared to
familiar objects (lower panel)
Anatomical region cluster Local maxima t-value cluster size P
Familiar [ Unfamiliar
Anterior prefrontal cortex -4 50 13 5.8 418 \.001
Anterior cingulate 2 26 0
R supplementary motor area 4 -28 65 4.9 94 \.01
Posterior cingulate -7 -52 22 4.5 92 \.01
Unfamiliar [ familiar
R insula 27 22 8 5.4 84 \.01
L precuneus/superior parietal lobe -13 -73 36 5.0 394 \.001
R inferior parietal lobe 34 -55 47 4.9 207 \.001
R precuneus/superior parietal lobe 9 -75 47 4.6 124 \.001
For clusters that span several anatomical regions, more than one local maximum is given. All clusters are significant when correcting for multiple
comparisons across the whole brain (FWE-corrected)
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and grip-inferences could be based on the objects’ affor-
dances. In the present study, goal- and grip-inferences were
made about everyday objects and as a consequence
required the activation of semantic knowledge, represent-
ing the learned association between an object’s goal and its
associated manner of usage.
Interestingly though, the strongest effects of object
familiarity in the right IPL were observed when subjects
were required to select the appropriate grip based on a goal
cue. This finding suggests that action semantics were
activated most strongly when planning actions based on
goal-related information, which is the default mode of
action planning. In contrast, the inverse mode of action
planning in which a goal is selected based on grip-related
information is less common and accordingly, in this case
action semantic information is less strongly activated.
Thereby this study provides support for the notion that
action semantics are selectively activated, depending on
the type of action inference that is made (see also: van Elk
et al. 2010a). In addition, the finding that the right IPL was
more strongly involved in activating semantic knowledge
when planning actions based on goals is in line with the
idea that this area represents object-directed actions in
terms of their goals. Studies in monkeys have shown for
instance that neurons in the inferior parietal lobe (IPL) fire
selectively depending on the final goal of the action (e.g. to
eat or place; Fogassi et al. 2005; Bonini et al. 2010). In line
with these findings, neuroimaging studies in humans have
shown that the intraparietal sulcus represents the goal or
the outcome of an observed action (Hamilton and Grafton
2006, 2008).
An important question is whether the effects observed
for action familiarity could be partly attributed to the ease
of responding (i.e. subjects responded faster to familiar
compared to unfamiliar objects). Previous studies have
localized effects of speed of responding primarily to
occipital, supplementary motor and contralateral motor
areas to the response hand (Oguz et al. 2003; Mohamed
et al. 2004). In contrast, in the present study, the effects of
object familiarity were most pronounced in parietal areas
and did not appear lateralized with respect to the
responding hand. Furthermore, reaction times were mod-
eled as a separate regressor, thereby minimizing the like-
lihood that the effects in the other conditions can be
attributed to differences in button press responses. Finally,
although a reaction time difference was observed between
goal and grip cues, this difference did not become apparent
at a neural level, thereby further supporting that the effects
of object familiarity cannot be attributed to differences in
responding or response times.
A possible functional mechanism underlying the effects
of object familiarity observed in the present study is the
ideomotor principle, according to which every action is
represented in terms of the effects it produces (Prinz 1997;
Hommel et al. 2001). That is, based on our previous
experiences, we have acquired associations between a
specific way of grasping an object (e.g. grasping a wine
bottle at the lower side) and the associated action effect
(i.e. pouring). On this account, action planning involves
selecting the required action effect, which in turn activates
the associated motor program required for accomplishing
the effect (Kunde et al. 2002). The ideomotor principle is
closely related to the hierarchical view of the motor sys-
tem, according to which higher-level action goals deter-
mine the selection of lower-level action features (Cooper
2002; Grafton and Hamilton 2007; Rosenbaum et al. 2007).
The present study suggests that the ease whereby action
goals and grips are selected is strongly determined by the
object’s familiarity. For familiar objects, the action–effect
associations are probably stronger than for unfamiliar
objects, simply because we have more experience with
using these objects. As a consequence activating these
associations during action planning is easier for familiar
compared to unfamiliar object pairs.
In our experimental paradigm, we exploited the fact that
many objects are associated with multiple target objects
and action effects. Based on the frequency of usage, some
target objects are probably more strongly associated with a
specific object than others. For instance, most people
would consider moving a wine bottle to a glass more
prototypical than moving a wine bottle to an ice bucket.
The present study specifically assessed effects of famil-
iarity by comparing different objects (e.g. a wine bottle vs.
a hammer). It remains unknown whether a similar effect of
familiarity can be observed when one and the same object
is used with a target that is more strongly or less strongly
associated with the object (e.g. a wine bottle and a wine
glass vs. a wine bottle and an ice bucket). Previous studies
have found a differential activation of motor-related brain
areas for the observation of incorrect object use (e.g.
adding salt instead of sugar to coffee; see: Manthey et al.
2003; Newman-Norlund et al. 2010), suggesting that
familiarity between objects may indeed modulate activa-
tion in these regions. However, in these cases, the objects
used were either completely correct or incorrect. An
interesting possibility for future research would be to
investigate whether the strength of the association between
different objects parametrically modulates the strength of
activation in motor-related brain areas.
The present study has implications for the representation
of semantic knowledge about objects. On the one hand, it
has been argued that semantic knowledge is represented in
an ‘amodal semantic hub’ that is localized to the anterior
temporal lobes and that supports the activation of semantic
representations in different modalities and for different
categories (Patterson et al. 2007; Gainotti 2011). On the
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other hand, according to an embodied view of cognition,
semantic knowledge is represented in modality-specific
brain areas (Beauchamp and Martin 2007; Grafton 2009)
and in line with this view, several studies have shown that
the processing of manipulable objects is accompanied by
the activation in premotor and parietal brain areas (Grafton
et al. 1997; Chao and Martin 2000; Grezes et al. 2003;
Kellenbach et al. 2003; Vingerhoets et al. 2009). In the
present study, we found that the retrieval of action
semantics was associated with a stronger parietal activation
for unfamiliar compared to familiar objects. The finding
that parietal areas, typically associated with high-level
action planning, are involved in the retrieval of action
semantics is in line with the multimodal account of object
knowledge and moreover suggests that the familiarity of
the concept determines the strength of activation in these
areas as well.
Conclusions
The present study showed that motor imagery is modulated
by the familiarity of the objects involved. Determining the
grip in relation to the end location of an action took more
effort for unfamiliar objects, as reflected in a stronger
activation in parietal brain areas, whereas mental imagery
of an action with familiar objects was associated with
increased activation in anterior prefrontal brain areas.
These findings provide further insight into the neural
structures that support action semantic knowledge for the
functional use of real-world objects, and suggest that action
semantic knowledge is activated most readily when actions
are planned in a goal-directed manner.
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